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Abstract 
 
Trade union responses to labour market activation policies are central to any 
assessment of their attitudes and strategies in the face of contemporary welfare state 
restructuring. Yet this issue has to date been the object of only limited theorization 
and minimal empirical investigation. We attempt to remedy this. Drawing on existing 
literatures in different disciplines, we first outline the theoretical grounds for predicting 
union opposition to or support for labour market activation measures. We then 
explore these competing arguments through a reconstruction and comparison of the 
development of union positions on labour market activation over time in two 
countries, France and the Netherlands. The case studies suggest that union stances 
on these policies are not straightforwardly determined by the structure of labour 
market institutions; considerations regarding the impact of activation initiatives on the 
role of unions in the institutions of the welfare state play a major role in mobilizing 
their consent or dissent. 
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Introduction 
 
Labour market activation --- understood as the closer articulation of social benefit policies 
and provisions to encourage (re)integration in work --- has been central to debates over the 
last quarter century on adapting welfare states to a transformed economic structure. It is today 
espoused by international organizations as well as political parties from across the ideological 
spectrum in most countries (Eichhorst et al., 2008). While activation connects easily with 
conventional right-wing themes such as reducing benefit dependency, it can also be framed in 
a language of social justice, as an attempt to make post-industrial labour markets more 
socially inclusive by combating risks of detachment faced by vulnerable groups with limited 
market power. This ambiguous quality (Bonoli, 2010) helps explain why activation has 
proved so popular with entrepreneurial political actors, eager to compete for the support of the 
median voter without repudiating their traditional ideological commitments. 
Social and labour market policy reform does not only turn on the construction of 
winning electoral coalitions; social actors, and especially trade unions, are key players in the 
politics of welfare state transformation. Despite declining membership rates, unions in many 
countries still have capacity to mobilize citizens against reforms they oppose (Anderson and 
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Lynch, 2007). Particularly where they have a role in the governance of existing welfare 
policies, they may even be able to veto changes (Ebbinghaus, 2010). And the cooperation of 
national trade unions --- and employers’ organizations --- may be useful for the effective 
implementation of some activation policies, particularly those requiring firm participation 
(Martin, 2005). 
Notwithstanding the significance of unions’ attitudes for the successful pursuit of 
activation reforms, little research has been conducted on this issue. While it has been 
recognised that activation confronts unions with a ‘dilemma’ (Valkenburg, 2004), neither the 
terms of this dilemma, nor the ways in which it is resolved in different national contexts, have 
been systematically explored. Do unions see only risks in activation policies, and fall back on 
the ‘conservative’ oppositional strategies of which they are accused in contemporary popular 
discourse, and for which there is some evidence from other social policy fields (Häusermann, 
2010)? Or might they see opportunities, and engage constructively in the development of an 
active social state? Under which conditions will union opposition or engagement be more 
likely? 
The present article attempts to provide some preliminary responses to these questions. 
We first discuss literature in political economy and industrial relations that suggests that the 
structure of labour market institutions will cause unions either to oppose or to support 
activation. We then introduce two strategically selected cases, France and the Netherlands, 
and briefly document the development of union stances on activation policies since the early 
1990s. Comparing across the cases and over time, our third section suggests that there is 
limited evidence of unions being consistently or predictably obstructive or constructive in the 
face of activation reforms. Instead, we highlight the significance for the formation of union 
preferences of an institutional factor relatively neglected in existing literatures, namely 
unions’ administrative role in the welfare state (see also Ebbinghaus, this issue). 
 
 
Predicting union attitudes to labour market activation 
 
Writing just over a decade ago, Crouch (2000: 71) argued that one of the key challenges 
facing trade unions was the risk that they ‘may come to represent secure labour market 
insiders whose position is envied and resented by outsiders drifting between temporary work 
and unemployment, against whose interests unions then start to work. Union membership has 
always been, and remains, far more common among older employees on permanent contracts 
than among younger workers, those in part-time or temporary employment and the 
unemployed (Ebbinghaus, 2006). With the magnitude of sectoral shifts and the increase in 
unemployment and atypical forms of employment since the 1970s, however, the 
representativeness of the typical union member has been in steady decline. 
Just as importantly, it is also argued that most union members today experience less 
exposure to labour market risk than other workers, particularly unemployment. Dismissal 
costs for permanent employees sharply increased in many European countries during the 
1960s and 1970s, and have since been scaled back modestly, if at all (Emmenegger, 2009a). 
Though net labour market instability has increased, its main impact is on groups who have 
never acquired the privileged ‘insider’ status with which union membership is strongly 
correlated. Indeed, the very existence of such groups helps to insulate permanent employees 
from the risk of losing their jobs, as in dualistic labour markets they come to serve as a buffer 
that absorbs the effects of cyclical declines in demand for employment and the flexible 
production strategies of employers (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001).  
On the basis of these observations, recent work on the ‘insider-outsider politics’ of 
labour market policy has suggested that securely employed workers will tend to oppose 
activation reforms, which have the stated aim of helping the unemployed (‘outsiders’) back 
into possibly permanent employment. It is argued that insiders will not only balk at 
supporting the cost of activation measures from which they do not themselves expect to 
benefit directly, but will actively resist them as a menace to their own medium-term 
employment security. Given stable levels of employment protection, it is only when a severe 
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macroeconomic shock suddenly ‘democratizes’ unemployment risks, and possibly also when 
the burden of financing generous unemployment benefits comes to be perceived as too great, 
that the securely employed will look more favourably on proposals for activation reforms 
(Gaston and Rajaguru, 2008; Rueda, 2006, 2007; Saint-Paul, 1998). 
Empirical tests of these arguments have to date concentrated mainly on the individual 
level (Emmenegger, 2009b; Nelson, 2009), sometimes with reference to the repercussions for 
Social Democratic party platforms and policy outputs (Rueda, 2006; 2007). But insofar as 
unions’ preferences and strategies can be understood with reference to an Olsonian logic of 
interest representation, or what is sometimes called the ‘logic of membership’ (Schmitter and 
Streeck, 1999), they also have clear implications for reactions to activation. At a theoretical 
level, Saint-Paul has indeed argued that his insider-outsider model of low support for 
activation will hold under corporatist determination of policy outcomes --- ‘where unions… 
decide on labour market policy’ --- as well as under assumptions of electoral determination 
(1998: 154). And although he does not primarily focus on unions, Rueda argues that in the 
British case it was partly the weakening of its historical links with organized labour that freed 
New Labour to focus more on outsider interests, and encouraged its embrace of activation 
policies in the mid-1990s (2006: 365). From this political economy perspective, then, we 
would expect unions more generally to adopt hostile and obstructive attitudes to activation, at 
least in highly regulated labour markets with the potential for marked insider-outsider 
cleavages. 
Students of trade unions and industrial relations argue, however, that the behaviour 
and actions of industrial unions cannot be reduced to the simple defence of their members’ 
interests. Streeck (2005: 269) suggests that such organizations want to be regarded ‘as 
representatives, not just of their members, but of all workers in their industry or society’. This 
helps us understand why --- as amply demonstrated by the literature on union revitalization 
(e.g. Baccaro et al., 2003; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Hyman, 2007) --- some unions have 
responded to membership decline by reaching out to currently unorganized sections of the 
workforce, far more than would be anticipated by thinner economic models of union action. It 
also suggests that they will often have strong incentives to remain on good terms with 
political authorities, on whom they rely for the recognition and sometimes also resources that 
allow them to endure in the face of the free-rider problems that their universalistic vocation 
entails (Streeck, 2005: 269). Both strategies necessitate defending not only the particular 
interests of their current members, but also the interests of other workers or, more broadly, the 
‘common good’. This perspective thus allows for unions adopting far more conciliatory or 
even supportive attitudes to activation reforms. 
To be sure, it can be anticipated that the different interests unions may seek to defend 
will often conflict. Such conflicts would be expected to crystallize in tensions between the 
rank and file and the peak leadership, as the latter clearly have the strongest incentives to 
adopt positions and strategies that can serve longer-term goals of organizational security 
which may, in the short-term, harm existing members. The natural reaction of unions would 
be to manage such tensions by adopting ‘critical but supportive’ positions on reforms, 
assuming these are intellectually and politically tenable. To the extent that they are not, and as 
work on union attitudes to pension reform has shown (Anderson and Lynch, 2007), the 
internal organization of unions --- the degree of centralization and resulting empowerment of 
the leadership relative to the base --- could be crucial in tipping the balance towards more 
obstructive or constructive stances on policy initiatives. 
Another important factor is the institutionalization or otherwise of peak-level unions 
in national policy-making fora. Strong institutionalization of unions in such bodies 
characterizes traditionally neo-corporatist political economies, but weaker forms have also 
developed with the rise of ‘new social pacts’ since the early 1990s (Molina and Rhodes, 
2002). Under conventional neo-corporatist arrangements, peak organizations of labour and 
business explicitly trade faithful representation of member demands for the organizational 
security that a ‘seat at the top table’ brings. A ‘logic of influence’ comes to rival the ‘logic of 
membership’ in the process of union preference formation, turning unions towards the 
function of interest ‘intermediation’ rather than simple representation, and making them more 
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likely to adopt policy positions and priorities that are congruent with those of the government 
(Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). New social pacts are more weakly institutionalized and based 
on a somewhat different logic of exchange (Hassel, 2009), but play a centralizing role within 
union confederations and thus help empower the top leadership relative to the rank and file 
(Anderson and Lynch, 2007). Either mode of nationally concerted policy making would 
therefore lead unions to adopt supportive attitudes towards activation reforms. While this 
prediction can be framed in purely rationalist terms, it is also compatible with suggestions that 
institutionalized policy concertation results in competitive ‘powering’ giving way to 
cooperative ‘puzzling’, where actors define their preferences in ways which are oriented 
towards the solution of commonly-defined problems (Culpepper, 2002). 
There are thus theoretical grounds for predicting very different union reactions in the 
face of activation reforms. Recent work in political economy implies that unions operating in 
highly regulated labour markets will generally resist any turn to activation strategies which 
hurt their largely insider membership. Industrial relations scholarship, however, suggests that 
unions may also have motives to adopt conciliatory stances that can appeal to other workers, 
other corporate actors and, especially, to governments. While conflicting incentives stemming 
from unions’ attentiveness both to their members and to their environment exist everywhere, 
an institutional framework for concerted policy making will be particularly important in 
drawing unions’ labour market policy preferences --- whether by rational calculation or 
through more ‘dialogical’ processes --- in a direction that is favourable to labour market 
activation. 
 
 
Unions and activation in France and the Netherlands 
 
Given the institutional profile of their labour markets, France and the Netherlands represent 
excellent cases through which these arguments can be explored empirically (cf. also Table 1). 
In both countries workers on open-ended contracts enjoy high levels of employment 
protection, providing grounds for the existence of potentially strong insider-outsider 
cleavages around issues of labour market risk. As will be discussed below, French and Dutch 
union confederations have traditionally played a significant role in the administration of 
unemployment insurance benefits, but in neither case is unemployment insurance operated on 
a voluntary state-subsidized basis (the so-called ‘Ghent model’), however, meaning that 
insecure workers do not have selective incentives to remain unionized as in countries such as 
Denmark or Sweden (Clasen and Viebrock, 2008). In part for this reason, overall unionization 
rates were in both countries historically relatively low, and fell steeply --- by between 10 and 
15% --- in between the early 1970s and the late 1990s (Visser, 2006). In the late 1990s 
unemployed people were half as likely as employed people to be unionized in the 
Netherlands, and a tenth as likely in France (Ebbinghaus, 2006).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Though both the Netherlands and France have a number of competing union 
confederations --- the institutionalized legacy of waning political and religious cleavages that 
structured the formative years of their respective labour movements --- and relatively similar 
levels of peak-level centralization of authority, in many other respects the industrial relations 
contexts in which unions operate in the two countries are very different. France has a history 
of highly conflictual industrial relations, with traditionally difficult relationships between 
unions and employers and an overbearing state that undermines and infantilizes collective 
actors in civil society (Levy, 1999). While certain unions have endeavoured to build more 
cooperative relations with employers and governments since the 1980s, more generalized 
forms of political exchange or tripartite concertation remain impossible (Parsons, 2002). By 
contrast, corporatism is one of the defining features of policy-making in the Netherlands 
(Andeweg and Irwin, 2009). Powerful bipartite and tripartite institutions were set up after the 
Second World War, and have played a central role in the political economy. Though Dutch 
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corporatism was seriously challenged by the changed economic context of the 1970s, it not 
only survived but has actually flourished in recent decades (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997), 
leading to the signature of a number of national level social pacts. Part of the explanation for 
this difference in government-union relations between the two countries possibly results from 
their contrasting electoral systems, and the political incentives that governments in each 
country have for being seen to ‘share policy space’ with the unions when pursuing potentially 
controversial reforms (Baccaro and Lim, 2007; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). 
In the light of the theories reviewed above, we would therefore anticipate very 
different union reactions to the activation turn in labour market policy since the early 1990s. 
With an extreme membership bias in favour of permanently employed workers with limited 
exposure to labour market risk, and with few obvious institutional inducements for the 
adoption of cooperative bargaining positions, French unions would be expected to be more 
sectional and therefore less sympathetic towards activation reforms. In the Netherlands, any 
temptation unions might have had to fall back on a similarly narrow defence of their 
members’ labour market policy interests should have been tempered by strong corporatist 
institutions and the encompassing behaviours and policy preferences they in principle 
engender. At least among those countries with highly regulated labour markets, the Dutch and 
French unions could thus be expected to be at polar ends of the opposition-support spectrum. 
Yet their actual stances reveal a more complex set of preferences and behavioural influences. 
 
 
France 
 
Since the early 1980s, benefit provision for the unemployed in France has been progressively 
dualized into two relatively separate and un-articulated ‘worlds’, based on tax-financed social 
assistance and contributory social insurance (Palier, 2010). Until around the turn of the 
millennium, the reaction of French unions to activation policies was also rather dualistic, 
depending in large part on which world the policy proposal concerned.  
Unions have traditionally been relatively supportive of the activation of social 
assistance beneficiaries. In the debates of the mid-1980s over the introduction and design of a 
general social assistance scheme to provide support to those who fell through the social 
insurance net, they came down decisively in favour of benefit policies that included a work or 
training condition for the recipient (Bode, 1991). In 1987, when the Conseil économique et 
social (CES) set out proposals foreshadowing the future Revenu minimum d’insertion (which 
provides a minimum income to unemployed adults without rights to unemployment benefit), 
the Confédération française démocratique des travailleurs (CFDT) commended the 
suggestion to link minimum income receipt to the signature of an individualized insertion 
contract, a proposition which they said ‘allows the maintenance of the work/income link’. 
Force ouvrière (FO) commented that this proposal had the advantage of ‘avoiding the 
absorption of the problem [of individuals without insurance-based social protection] by pure 
assistance’ (CES, 1987: 19, 21). Two decades later, these confederations reacted similarly to 
propositions for a work-linked ‘autonomy benefit’ for those under 25, who are still not 
eligible for general social assistance in France (CES, 2001: 57-61). Only when proposed 
insertion measures have derogated too greatly from general labour law has opposition from 
organized labour been any obstacle to the activation of minimum income recipients. An 
example was the 2003 Revenu minimum d’activité, which reduced the social security 
contributions of employers who took on the long-term unemployed; the unions vigorously 
opposed this (Damon, 2004).  
With respect to the activation of unemployment insurance recipients, however, the 
situation was long more complicated. Unemployment insurance in France is regulated on a 
bipartite (in French, paritaire) basis by the unions and the employers’ associations through 
national collective agreements, extended by law (Freyssinet, 2010). When this system was 
established in 1958, the government insisted that the new unemployment insurance institution 
UNEDIC (Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le 
commerce) should restrict its activities to compensation, to avoid encroaching on the state’s 
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competence in other employment matters (Daniel, 1997). FO, then the most enthusiastic 
proponent of a paritaire governance system, happily fell in line with this demand, and indeed 
gradually elevated the strict separation between unemployment insurance and employment 
promotion issues to the status of a strong doctrinal stance. 
As FO co-presided UNEDIC from 1959 to 1992, this situation largely kept the 
activation of the insured unemployed --- or any financial, managerial or operational 
integration between unemployment insurance and state-regulated policies --- off the agenda. 
When governments of left or right proposed closer articulation between insurance benefits 
and general employment policies, they met marked hostility from the unions in their role as 
custodians of UNEDIC (Clegg, 2005: 171-8). Even when the CFDT --- long seen as the most 
reformist French union, and vocal in its advocacy of inclusive policies for outsiders during the 
1980s (Bode, 1997) --- captured the co-presidency of UNEDIC in the early 1990s, 
receptiveness to structural reforms did not immediately increase. When a 1993 report 
commissioned by the government proposed tackling UNEDIC’s spiralling deficits through a 
reform package combining increased tax-financing and closer integration between UNEDIC 
and the state-run public employment service to facilitate activation, the CFDT responded by 
arguing instead for cuts in benefit levels, additional to the already tough retrenchment it had 
negotiated the previous year (Clegg, 2005: 243). 
Rather than being straightforwardly oppositional, therefore, the French unions’ 
reactions to activation policies have traditionally varied markedly with the type of benefit 
targeted for reform. Over the first decade of the new millennium, however, this traditionally 
dualistic response pattern has begun to give way to a more generally supportive stance, as the 
unions have warmed to the development of activation measures within unemployment 
insurance (Clegg, 2011). The turning point was the adoption in 2000 of a mechanism that 
linked receipt of insurance benefits to an individualized agreement detailing the rights and 
responsibilities of the unemployed individual, eventually introduced under the name of the 
Plan d’aide au retour à l’emploi (PARE). This initiative was proposed not by government but 
by the main employers’ confederation MEDEF, as part of the broader ‘social modernization’ 
(réfondation sociale) platform with which it sought to wrest control of the social reform 
agenda from the then socialist government. At varying speeds, the unions rallied to this 
radically new approach. Acceptance by the CFDT --- historically most positive about the 
principle of activation, if not its application in unemployment insurance --- was swift, with 
activation already having a prominent place in their statement of initial positions ahead of the 
negotiations in spring 2000 (CFDT, 2000). It accordingly signed the agreement creating the 
PARE, along with two smaller union confederations. Though FO, like the more 
systematically belligerent ex-communist Confederation générale du travail (CGT), ultimately 
refused to sign the agreement on the PARE, even it showed a growing if grudging willingness 
to entertain the principle of activation during the negotiations, largely from a concern to 
prevent the total blockage and breakdown of the paritaire unemployment benefit system 
(Freyssinet, 2002: 45).  
At the demand of the government, concerned about the emergence of parallel 
employment service networks for the insured and other job-seekers, responsibility for the 
implementation of the PARE was ultimately vested in the public employment service, with 
the administrative agencies of the unemployment insurance system retaining responsibility for 
the payment of benefits. As the decade wore on, this complex delivery structure was 
increasingly criticized for undermining the effectiveness of the new activation policy (Cour 
des comptes, 2006), and the old idea of a full merger between the public employment service 
and UNEDIC progressively returned to the top of the policy agenda. When this proposal was 
announced by President Chirac in his 2007 New Year address to the social partners, it 
provoked an angry response by the unions, who together with the employers’ organizations 
issued a common statement of opposition (Les Echos, 12/1/2007). But when barely 8 months 
later the same proposal was reiterated by the freshly elected President Sarkozy in his first 
high-profile social affairs speech, the unions’ reaction was far less hostile, with the CFDT 
secretary-general calling the merger a ‘useful reform process, in which the CFDT is ready to 
engage’ (Les Echos, 19 September 2007). Negotiations between the social partners and the 
 7 
government were successful, and a reform of the organization of the public employment 
service passed less than five months later, with the social partners retaining their prerogatives 
over setting unemployment insurance contributions and benefits, but a new integrated public 
agency taking over all benefit delivery and employment operations (Rousseau, 2008). 
In sum, if it has never been possible to reduce the French unions’ attitudes to 
activation to one of simple opposition, it is even less so today. From having selectively 
supported activation measures for certain groups of benefit claimants, their positions have 
evolved considerably over the last two decades, through endorsing specific activation 
measures for the insured unemployed to more recently accepting the articulation of these with 
measures for other groups in a more streamlined and thoroughgoing activating labour market 
policy. 
 
 
The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands has probably more firmly --- and certainly more famously --- shed the 
passive bias of its welfare state than France in the last two decades. A 1990 report by the 
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 
WRR) set the stage for this shift in advocating the coupling of welfare reforms and activating 
labour market policies. In the 1990s, increasing labour force participation became the 
accepted goal of all societal actors, and the emphasis of social policy reform has since been 
on increasing labour force participation and getting people (back) into work.  
In line with expectations, the large Dutch unions have by and large embraced the goal 
of increasing labour force participation in the last two decades. However, closer inspection 
shows that the harmony of the ‘polder model’ has not always reigned over Dutch labour 
market policy, and the precise stance of the unions has subtly but perceptibly shifted over the 
period. While they accepted the activation agenda as well as part-time and other forms of 
‘atypical’ work (crucial to the ‘Dutch miracle’) comparatively early, the unions have shown 
more apprehension about the precise implementation and effect of activation. The major 
reform of the implementation structure of unemployment (and disability) insurance in 1999, 
introduced under the slogan of ‘putting work before income’, notably resulted in a major 
conflict between the unions and the government (Grünell, 1999). The main union 
confederation, FNV (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging) has over the last decade also 
emphasized that ‘decent work’ rather than any work is its primary goal, stressing that the 
increasingly marketized implementation of activation is a threat to solidarity (FNV, 2009). In 
other words, the unions seem to have qualified their supportive stance on the development of 
activation in the 1990s and have adopted a more reserved attitude to specific policy proposals.  
Three pillars characterize Dutch activation strategies: reform of social security; 
reintegration; and education and training. But because it was a pioneer in reformulating policy 
objectives in line with activation, the most important reforms in these three areas have for 
over a decade been focused on changing their administration and governance, or what Van 
Berkel (2010) terms ‘operational policy reforms’. Various rounds of reforms have introduced 
market principles in the administration of activation, enhancing the delivery-level 
involvement of the private sector and, significantly, reducing the role of the social partners. 
Illustrative of these changes are the reforms to the institutions and administration of work and 
income in the last two decades (De Koning, 2009).  
While the Netherlands enjoys its status as a corporatist political economy mainly 
through the social partners’ ‘semi-public status in public policy-making’ (Hemerijck, 
2003:238, emphasis added), an additional and less highlighted source of their influence 
traditionally lies in policy implementation, particularly in the realm of social insurance. In the 
course of various government-led reforms to the provision of work and income over the last 
decade, however, this influence has been significantly diluted, gradually sidelining the trade 
unions in the debate on and implementation of activation measures. A 1993 Parliamentary 
enquiry highlighted instances of the social partners abusing their managerial prerogatives in 
social insurance, using long-term disability benefits to facilitate industrial restructuring. The 
 8 
government interpreted this as the main impediment to more successful activation reforms 
and as a rationale to reduce progressively the role of the social partners in benefit 
administration. A parallel process of reform of the public employment services in the 1990s 
diminished the administrative role which the social partners had gained only in 1991. The 
2001 Wet Structuur Uitvoering Werk en Inkomen (Act on the Structural Implementation of 
Work and Income, SUWI) completed the dismantling of the bipartite administration of social 
insurance, delegating it to independent (but still public) administrative agencies known as 
Uitvoeringsinstituten Werknemersverzekeringen (UWVs). At the same time, SUWI 
introduced further competition and marketization into the provision of activation services by 
privatizing the activation arm of the PES and reorganizing its remaining parts into local 
Centra voor Werk en Inkomen (CWIs) (Van Berkel, 2010). In 2009, these centres were 
merged with the benefits agency (UWV), completing the move to a one-service counter for 
those out of work. From being deeply involved in the administration of the work-welfare 
interface, the only role today left for the social partners is their representation in the Raad 
voor Werk en Inkomen (RWI), which plays a purely advisory role on activation policy.  
From a group-oriented focus on vulnerable labour market participants in the 1990s, 
Dutch activation policies have in the past decade become more individualized. Anyone 
receiving a benefit and deemed in need of assistance with finding a job can submit a plan for 
an individual reintegration agreement (individuele reintegratie overeenkomst, IRO). If this is 
approved, then it is the individual claimant, not the benefit administration, who decides which 
(private) reintegration service to use in order to find employment. The reintegration provider 
is paid by the benefits administrator according to the results achieved (whether the claimant 
indeed finds a job and is still employed after six months). This formula of course contains a 
significant risk of ‘cream-skimming’ (reintegration providers only offering their services to 
those who are likely to find suitable employment soon), though compensatory measures have 
been adopted to avoid this problem. While consistent and firm prioritizing of reintegration is 
backed up by sanctioning of benefits, it should also be noted that cutting or outright denial of 
benefits occurs relatively rarely (Bruttel and Sol, 2006: 81). As mentioned, the unions have 
nonetheless been wary of this direction in recent reform, and have not been hesitant in 
articulating their criticisms. At the same time, they seem to be resigned to the new paradigm, 
and have tailored their individual member services to reflect it. For example, unions 
increasingly offer members access to in-house consultants who can offer help and advice on 
drawing up an IRO.  
As in France, then, the attitude of Dutch unions towards activation policies has 
evolved over the last two decades. Unlike their French counterparts, though, they have 
become on balance less rather than more receptive to activation, going from being full 
partners in its early development to somewhat critical observers of its onward march. This 
shift has paralleled a fundamental change in the role of Dutch unions in social and labour 
market policy, driven mainly by the development of activation itself. Especially since the 
second half of the 1990s, reforms have seen the unions evicted from their traditional role as 
co-administrators of social benefit policies in favour of a publicly controlled but incentive-
driven system. In response, while unions were partially able to parry early reform efforts by 
pursuing improvements to employee benefits through collective bargaining (see Johnston et 
al, this issue), they increasingly have fallen back on their role in more advisory tripartite 
institutions where their voice is still sought and heard, but they have also refocused on the 
development of new services for existing members.  
 
 
Discussion: Welfare institutions and the mobilization of consent 
 
As should be clear from the foregoing discussion, the reactions of French and Dutch unions to 
labour market activation are difficult to reconcile with theoretical expectations based on the 
structure of their labour market institutions alone. Though perhaps the least classically 
corporatist of developed political economies, and despite a strong membership bias towards 
labour market insiders, the French unions have never simply opposed all activation policies, 
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and with some hesitations have indeed come to accept their universalization in the 2000s. In 
the Netherlands, where unions would be expected to adopt more encompassing policy 
positions, their initially upbeat attitude to the activation agenda has by contrast been 
somewhat tempered lately. 
These findings certainly highlight the limits of over-deterministic understandings of 
the institutional bases of union attitudes and behaviours. Perhaps more interesting, however, 
is the light the two cases appear to shed on an institutional variable that is less commonly 
discussed in the literature on union preference formation, unions’ historical participation in 
the institutions of welfare governance (Crouch, 2001; Ebbinghaus, 2010). Despite their very 
different industrial relations contexts, French and Dutch unions both have long histories of 
co-managing social insurance institutions with employers’ associations, roles from which they 
traditionally derived considerable material resources. In different ways, reference to these 
welfare institutions helps us better understand the evolving attitude of unions to activation 
initiatives in each case. 
In France, where there is nothing ‘natural’ about the sharing of public policy space 
and where organized labour has few membership-derived resources, union confederations live 
in permanent fear of a statist takeover of social insurance bodies such as UNEDIC. This helps 
understand why attitudes to activation reforms conventionally varied so substantially 
according to the claimant group affected. Initiatives concerning unemployment insurance 
recipients necessarily involved some blurring between the spheres of competence of the social 
partners and the state, and opened a breach in the defence of UNEDIC against much-dreaded 
étatisation. By contrast, activation measures for claimants of tax-financed social assistance 
pose no such risk, and indeed by upholding --- albeit in a different way to contributory social 
insurance --- the ‘work-income link’ in social policy, could actually help bolster the 
legitimacy of unions’ administrative involvement elsewhere (Clegg, 2002). 
Given this, why did the French unions eventually warm first to the extension of 
activation measures to unemployment insurance and then the partial merger of the institutions 
of the paritaire system and the public employment service to facilitate their implementation? 
The strategic context for this shift has been the growing determination of other actors --- first 
MEDEF, and more recently the government --- to drive though activation reforms. At the 
time of the 2000 réfondation sociale, MEDEF threatened simply to abandon its seats in 
UNEDIC if negotiations over their reform proposals were not concluded to their satisfaction. 
For all the unions except the CGT, the desire to avoid this, and ‘save paritarisme’, was crucial 
in motivating their search for the compromise that led to PARE being introduced (Freyssinet, 
2002: 45). Similarly, the unions’ decision to fall in line with Sarkozy’s proposal for the 
delivery-level merger between unemployment insurance and the public employment service 
in 2007 reflected awareness that the freshly elected president was more able to push ahead 
without the unions if they opposed his plans than had been the weakened and discredited 
Chirac. In this context the preservation of a real, if much reduced, role for UNEDIC in labour 
market policy was the best possible outcome, and engaging in discussions over the further 
development of activation was the price that they were willing to pay (Willmann, 2009). 
Across both instances of reform, the defence of UNEDIC remained a priority for the unions, 
but in an evolving political context the development of activation had come to be seen not as 
contradicting this, but as being a precondition.  
To be clear, it is argued here that the behaviour of other actors --- employers and the 
government --- has been a more significant determinant of evolving union positions on 
activation in France than competition between the different union confederations. Though the 
capture of the presidency of UNEDIC from FO by CFDT in 1993 reflected such competition 
between the two confederations, it did little in itself to change the dominant union line on the 
activation of the insured unemployed. This shifted only in the late 1990s, when the strategic 
reorientation of MEDEF decisively altered the terms of a possible union-employer 
compromise that could preserve UNEDIC as a paritaire institution. 
In the Netherlands, the unions --- perhaps surer of their legitimacy and thus less 
sensitive about possible erosion of their prerogatives --- appeared initially to see no obvious 
tension between their established administrative roles and the development of activation. 
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Over time, however, other actors, notably Dutch governments began to see precisely such a 
tension, and began their moves to evict the social partners from the work and income 
administration. It was specifically at this time that debates between the unions and the 
government over activation became more conflictual, and the unions’ vigorous opposition to 
the 1999 proposals to reform implementation structures was --- although framed in more 
general terms --- widely interpreted as a rearguard action to preserve their own institutional 
positions (Grünell, 1999). Having traditionally more or less proportionally split the tasks and 
spoils of administrative involvement, the main union federations fought this battle together. 
As described above, this was ultimately in vain, given the government’s determination to 
push ahead with its reforms and promote what it saw as the optimal delivery structure. The 
resulting exclusion of the unions from any implementation role has arguably made it less 
possible for them to obstruct further marketization reforms that they oppose (Mabbett and 
Freier, 2011). But as the unions have developed a more critical stance towards activation 
measures and have refocused on the provision of services to their core membership, in line 
with their reduced administrative involvement in social and labour market policy, they have 
arguably become more likely to oppose such reforms in the first place. 
In many respects this account only underscores how institutional arrangements can 
draw unions away from policy stances based on narrow ‘logics of membership’ towards more 
encompassing positions. What it also highlights, however, is that the most crucial institutions 
in this respect may not be the ones --- such as national social pacts --- to which most attention 
is normally paid in the literature on unions and welfare state reform. It is because activation 
reforms have not --- or at least not yet --- proved irreconcilable with the French unions’ 
continued participation in the more subaltern institutions of welfare administration that the 
latter have been able to serve as a lever in mobilizing their consent for reform initiatives, even 
in the absence of any explicit mechanisms for political exchange between governments and 
unions. 
As the Dutch case shows particularly well, though, the development of activation 
policies carries logics that potentially push against the continuing involvement of social actors 
in the administrative machinery of the welfare state (Clegg, 2008), as the self-administration 
that characterized social insurance arrangements in many countries is challenged by the twin 
pressures of increased public oversight and control, and enhanced competition in service 
delivery. To the extent that these pressures are determined by the issues prioritized in 
institutional and policy reform, the constructive engagement of trade unions in the 
reconfiguration of the welfare state depends not just on the strategic behaviour of the unions 
themselves, but also on the choices and strategies of governments and other policy actors.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although their stance on activation seems to offer a crucial test of how trade unions can and 
do respond to contemporary welfare state restructuring initiatives, there has been little 
research to date on this issue. The aim of this article was to take a first step in remedying this 
situation. Our comparison of the Dutch and French experiences has shown that variation in 
union positions on these reforms is not straightforwardly or predictably determined by the 
labour market institutions that have received most attention in the political economy or 
industrial relations literatures. Though the cases suggest that variations in unions’ attitudes to 
activation in time and space are indeed best explained by the differing and changing 
institutional incentive structures they face, we have also pointed to the influence in this 
context of the administrative institutions of the welfare state itself --- institutions which are 
themselves often challenged by current work-welfare reform agendas. 
The broader implication of this analysis is that unions are neither condemned to 
oppose contemporary welfare state restructuring agendas nor liable to be co-opted to them by 
purely symbolic inducements. Rather, their attitude will often be shaped by how far 
contemporary reform agendas can be reconciled with ongoing union involvement in the 
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welfare state machinery, in traditional or updated forms. Though the union role in welfare 
institutions was historically particularly strong in France and the Netherlands, it was a feature 
of conventional welfare state arrangements, across a range of social policy fields, in most 
European countries. Broader comparative work, across policy fields and in different political 
and institutional contexts, would help to model the scope for and limits to new forms of 
political exchange around welfare institutions in the post-industrial age. 
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Table 1: Select Labour Market Institutions in France and the Netherlands 
 France Netherlands 
 1998 2007 1998 2007 
a) Employment Protection Legislation for 
Regular Employees (index 0-6) 2.98 3.05 2.73 2.04 
b) Average Replacement Rate of Unemployment 
Benefits (%) 36.5 39.0 52.2 33.9 
c) Union Density (%)  8.5  8.0 23.8 21.2 
d) Ratio of Density Unemployed/Employed  0.11 -- 0.54 -- 
e) Authority of Union Confederations over 
Affiliates (index 0-1) 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
f) Number of National Social Pacts Concluded 
since 1980 0 0 4 7 
Notes and Sources: a) and b) Source = OECD; c), e) and f) Source = ICTWSS 
(2009); d) Source = Ebbinghaus (2006); -- = data unavailable. 
